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“Thus there is an inherent conflict between two goals. The ideals of democracy
and equality require as proportional representation as possible while efficient go-
vernment often requires less proportional representation” (Laakso and Taagepera
(1981), p. 107).
1 Introduction
Electoral systems differ in terms of government efficiency and representativeness.
I focus on representativeness,1 which is the system’s ability to produce laws that
reflect the will of voters. In a perfectly representative system, each party’s power
would be proportional to their share of the votes received.
Under the proportional rule, a Parliament’s composition perfectly reflects a
party’s share of the vote, and thus matches voter preferences. Common wisdom
suggests that proportional systems should be the most equitable.2 This is not
necessarily the case: consider for example the experience of Italy during the 2006-
2008 Prodi government. A small pivotal party succeeded in heavily influencing his
decisions. I will show that the common wisdom is misleading: plurality rule can
sometimes better reflects voter preferences.
Two filters impact representativeness and can induce distortions (see Figure
1): the electoral system (filter 1) and the coalition formation stage (filter 2). All
electoral systems other than the proportional approach will lead to a distortion in
the composition of Parliament. At the coalition formation stage, this distortion
is due to two factors: i) some parties are excluded from the government, and
ii) the share of power amongst the others differs from the distribution of seats in
Parliament, since pivotal parties enjoy disproportionately strong bargaining power.
Voters’ misrepresentation of preferences depends on the distortions in both filters
1 and 2. When these distortions are of opposite sign, the two distortions will
compensate for one another, possibly up to the point where they cancel out.
While several papers have been devoted to each distortion separately,3 this
paper is, to the best of my knowledge, the first to analyse the entire electoral
process, from elections to government formation. Within the (possibly infinite)
set of potential electoral rules, I focus my attention exclusively on proportional
1Efficiency, i.e., the capability to produce well structured laws, that minimise resource was-
tage, is beyond the scope of this work.
2See, for instance, Douglas (1923). However, one drawback of proportional representation is
the greater instability and the increased time required to enact laws, compared with majority
voting systems. See Laakso and Taagepera (1981), Nurmi (1981) and Schofield (1981).
3Besides the well known paper from Taagepera and Shugart (1989), Morelli (2004) and
Kestelman (1999) offer a clear and succinct review of the literature on distortions in electoral
rules. Baron and Ferejohn (1989), Snyder Jr., Ting, and Ansolabehere (2005) and Kalandrakis
(2006) study certain properties of the coalition formation game.
Figure 1: The government formation process
and plurality approaches, which account for most western democracies. I assume
that parties act non-cooperatively during government formation. I compute the
misrepresentation of voters’ preferences in the two systems, defined as the diffe-
rence between parties’ power and their share of the votes received. I derive the
conditions under which one system reflects citizens’ preferences better than the
other.
Not surprisingly, the pivotal position of small parties in coalition formation
contexts allows them to enjoy political power that is more than proportional to
their share of the seats. This distortion is reduced when the parties are impatient
to form a coalition. The distribution of seats under plurality rule is favourable to
large parties. Pushing in opposite directions, the distortions compensate; when
their magnitude is similar, the voters’ preferences are better represented under
plurality rule. I conclude that majority voting is preferable when parties are
patient, whilst the proportional rule is more representative when the parties are
impatient.
Section 2 sets the framework of this study and describes the model used. Sec-
tion 3 describes my results and discusses the consequences of relaxing certain
assumptions. Section 4 validates the model using data from the 2006 and 2008
Italian elections. The last section concludes the paper.
2 The framework and the model
2.1 The political process
The political process begins with elections; negotiations occur only once the distri-
bution of seats in Parliament is known. Parties try to form a coalition that controls
the majority of seats; when they succeed, they share power. The government can
rule the country if it is supported by a majority: at all times, the parties’ shares
of power must satisfy their participation constraints.
To form a coalition requires agreeing on a political program and on the dis-
tribution of economic benefits. Parties in the winning coalition hold office and
enjoy ideological benefits.4 For expositional convenience, I consider that the win-
ning coalition shares a budget that can be used to implement the political agenda;
parties are self-interested and only care about their own share.5
Shares depend on bargaining power; they are the outcome of either a coopera-
tive or a non-cooperative game. Cooperative coalition theory applies when forming
the grand coalition maximises the aggregated profit. Non-cooperative theory ap-
plies when players maximise their own payoffs given the others’ best responses,
which usually occurs if it is convenient to deviate from the cooperative equili-
brium. Belonging to the government is necessary to obtain a positive payoff; if a
coalition controls the majority of seats, there is no interest in enlarging it. It is
thus reasonable to expect that parties will act non-cooperatively.
Coalition formation begins with the selection of a party, called the ‘formateur’,
that will be in charge of leading negotiations.6 If a single party controls the ma-
jority of seats, it will govern the country unimpeded. The method of selection of
a formateur is usually not determined by the constitution; larger parties have a
greater likelihood of being selected. Baron and Ferejohn (1989) and Austen-Smith
and Banks (1988) propose alternative ways of computing the probability of being
formateur. Austen-Smith and Banks (1988) assumes that the parties’ shares de-
termine the probability of being a successful formateur; the largest party is chosen
first, and in the event they fail to form a coalition, the second largest is chosen,
4Ideological benefits include being able to implement preferred policies. Holding office confers
direct and indirect monetary benefits including, for instance, the ability to determine public
expenditures in strategic sectors. Some papers concentrate on either office (e.g., Riker (1962) or
Baron and Ferejohn (1989)) or ideological (e.g., Schofield (1986)) benefits. Austen-Smith and
Banks (1990) analyse both separately, assuming they are orthogonal. In Sened (1996) the two
elements are amalgamated.
5Alternatively, i) think of orthogonal projects that need to be financed, with each party
interested in one project, or ii) assume that parties fix the time devoted to crafting legislative
proposals, with power representing the ability to pursue one’s own agenda.
6For a detailed explanation of the role of the formateur and how it is chosen, see Diermeier
and Merlo (2004).
and so forth. In contrast, Baron and Ferejohn (1989) directly attach to parties
a probability of being a successful formateur that is equal to their share of the
vote. When the formateur is successful, it always belongs to the winning coalition.
The two procedures give similar results; I follow Baron and Ferejohn (1989)’s
approach, which is common in the theoretical literature,7 and performs well in
empirical tests.8
2.2 The model
I consider a country with 3 parties and 3 groups of homogeneous citizens indexed
by i; ci denote the relative sizes of the groups, i.e., the proportion of votes won
by each party; c1 + c2 + c3 = 1. Without loss of generality, I order the groups
by their size, thus 1 > c1 ≥ c2 ≥ c3 > 0. I assume that the number of parties
remains unchanged when the electoral rule changes; I do not consider ideological
restrictions during coalition formation.9 Party i’s political program maximises
the utility of voters in group i. The vector e = (e1, e2, e3) denotes the parties’
share of the seats. An electoral system is seen as a function F that transforms
parties’ shares of votes into shares of seats, i.e., e = F (c). I focus on two systems:
proportional and majority voting (also called “plurality rule”). Under proportional
rule, the parties’ shares of seats equal the shares of votes received, i.e., ei = ci.
Under plurality rule, the country is divided into Q districts (one for each available
seat); in each district, the candidate who receives the most votes wins: ei =
Qi(c)
Q
,
where Qi(c) is the number of districts in which party i secures the majority of
votes cast.
Assumption 1 (No standing-alone) No party ever obtains the majority of the
seats: thus, e1 < 0.5 and, a fortiori, c1 < 0.5.
10
The grey area in Figure 2 shows the possible combinations of e2 and e3 taking
into account the ordering 0.5 > e1 ≥ e2 ≥ e3 > 0.
Assumption 2 (Constant coalition value) The resources available to allocate
remains constant. The bargaining issue boils down to the “sharing a dollar” pro-
blem, where each party (and its voters) is only interested in its share of the total
budget.
7See Baron and Diermeier (2001) or Diermeier, Eraslan, and Merlo (2007).
8See Diermeier and Merlo (2004).
9Fixing the number of parties is a short-term assumption. Ideological restrictions are not an
issue; the model can be understood as the process that occurs when ideologically close parties
must negotiate. The exclusion of a party can be reproduced by rescaling the shares of the vote.
10Since non-proportional electoral frameworks favour big parties, c1 > 0.5 would imply e1 ≥
0.5.
Figure 2: Possible combinations of e2 and e3.
When no party secures a majority, the bargaining phase begins. A coalition S
is the result of an agreement between 2 parties regarding how to share the budget.
Let Z denote the set of all feasible allocations, Z = {z ∈ <3+ :
3∑
i=1
zi ≤ 1}, zi is
the budget share of party i. The agents’ utility, linear in zi, is independent of zj,
i.e., Ui(z) = zi. A winning coalition has to be supported by at least half of all
Parliamentarians. D ⊆ 2{1,2,3} is the set of all possible winning coalitions; with
3 parties, D does not depend on e: any pair of parties can secure a majority.
Given the asymmetry among the parties implied by the role of the formateur, we
henceforth denote the formateur by the first element in a coalition; thus coalitions
(i, j) and (j, i) are different.
At time t = 0 a party, called the formateur, is randomly chosen. To form a
coalition S ∈ D, the formateur proposes a vector z of shares to the parties in S;11
if z is accepted by S the game ends: the government is formed and the budget
is shared according to z. Otherwise, in the next period a formateur (possibly
the same one) is randomly chosen and the game continues until an agreement is
reached. I use the notation zji to indicate the i
th element of vector z when j is the
formateur.
Assumption 3 (Recognition probability) As in Baron and Ferejohn (1989),
the recognition probability pii of being a successful formateur is equal to party i’s
share of seats (i.e., pii = ei).
Following Kalandrakis (2006) and Snyder Jr., Ting, and Ansolabehere (2005),
I consider a bargaining game a` la Rubinstein-St˚ahl (Rubinstein (1982)). The
continuation value v is the vector of the parties’ expected utility during the next
period. I concentrate on stationary proposal strategies with no delay: in each
period a party behaves the same way and proposes a share vector such that all
parties belonging to the proposed coalition accept without delay.
11To have a winning coalition, all parties in S should obtain a positive share. There is no
reason to leave a positive share to parties outside the coalition.
Assumption 4 Parties discount the future (they care about the time needed, after
the elections, to form a government). The patience rate, δ < 1, is the same for all
parties.12
At time t, the utility of obtaining zi in t + k is: Ui(z, k) = δ
kzi; the parties’
outside opportunity is zero. Party i’s continuation value vi = δ
∑3
h=1 pihz
h
i , is
the discounted expected utility of i, conditional on forming a coalition in the
subsequent period; the uncertainty concerns the formateur’s identity, and the value
of v depends on the recognition probabilities.
Given the vector of seat shares e and the time discount factor δ, a game is
denoted by Γ (δ, e). When an agent serves as formateur, its action consists of
proposing a division zi ∈ Z of the budget, and the others’ action space consists of
accepting the formateur’s proposal or not. A Stationary, Subgame Perfect, Pure
Strategy (SSPPS) equilibrium for game Γ (δ, e) is a set zi of stationary strategies
and acceptance strategies. In equilibrium, SSPPS implies no delay: the formateur
proposes a share that is immediately accepted. A SSPPS equilibrium requires
the share of all parties in the coalition to be such that zi ≥ vi;
13 the existence
of a SSPPS Nash equilibrium is not an issue for game Γ (δ, e) according to the
arguments of Banks and Duggan (2000). Other equilibria may exist; I focus on
the stationary ones in pure strategies.
Voters preferences. Preferences cannot be directly observed; people’s votes
can. If voters act strategically, we cannot deduce their preferences from their vote;
a change in the electoral system may impact the voting strategy. I assume sincere
voting; note that, in addition to its use in the theoretical literature, recent em-
pirical studies have shown that the hypothesis of non-strategic voting cannot be
rejected: for instance, Hooghe, Maddens, and Noppe (2006) find evidence that the
aggregate behaviour of the voters did not change significantly after the last change
of government in Belgium. They interpreted this as a signal of myopic/sincere vo-
ting, which is reasonable under majority voting conditions when the parties’ policy
vectors are orthogonal or at least sufficiently different not to be seen by voters as
substitutes. Furthermore, it is costly to be informed about politics (programmes,
performances, the electoral system, other voters’ expected behaviours), and voters
may prefer to vote sincerely. Assuming sincere voting allows us to infer the voters’
preferences from their votes.
Measuring misrepresentation. The goal of the model is to relate voter
preferences to government policies.14 Given the voters’ choice, I determine the
12Note that only the smallest party’s δ impacts the results, so to account for different discount
rates, simply replace δ with the discount rate of the smallest party in the coalition.
13For more details, see Kalandrakis (2006), p. 444.
14Policies are interpreted in the context of party resources, which are proportional to the share
zi.
winning coalition and compute the parties’ shares. I compare the representative-
ness of the rules, measuring misrepresentation through My, where y = {PR;MV }
denotes the electoral system (PR=proportional rule, MV=majority voting).
Let Pr (h, j) be the probability of forming coalition {h, j}. The electoral system
y determines parties’ shares of seats, impacting the probability that a coalition will
form (Pr (h, j)) and influencing parties’ budget shares (zhi ).
My =
√√√√ 3∑
i=1
(
3∑
h=1
3∑
j=1
Pr (h, j) · zhi − ci
)2
(1)
Equation (1) represents the Euclidean distance between parties’ expected bud-
get share and the optimal one; i.e., it computes the distance between the parties’
expected power (discounted by the probability of forming each possible coalition)
and their shares of votes ci.
Equation 1 takes large values when parties are either under- or over-represented.
Over-representation occurs when a party, being pivotal for a coalition, obtains a
share of benefits larger than the share of the population that it represents.
To compute My , both ci and ei are necessary.
15 The relation between ci and
ei depends on the electoral system. Taagepera and Shugart (1989) show that, by
properly choosing the parameter τ , every electoral system can be approximated
through a function ei = F (ci) =
cτ
i∑n
j=1 c
τ
j
. For proportional representation, τ = 1
and ci = ei. Under plurality, the share of seats depends on the geographical
distribution of voters’ preferences over districts; for single-member district systems
and a normal population, τ ≈ 3 (Qualter (1968)), hence the name ‘cube rule’.16
According to Taagepera and Shugart (1989), τ = 2.5 better suits modern western
societies with plurality-based single-member district systems, while τ = 8 would
be a better approximation for the actual system in the USA. In the literature,
the cube rule (with τ = 3) is considered a good approximation in the two-party
case and it also fits the data for the three-party case; the precision of this measure
declines with more than 3 parties.
Assumption 5 (Cube rule) To compute the share of seats of a party under ma-
jority voting, I assume that we observe the aggregate number of votes for each party
(ci) and the cube rule holds, thus ei =
c3
i∑
3
j=1 c
3
j
.17
15We need ei to compute Pr (S) · z
S
i .
16J. P. Smith formulated this relationship in 1909, Duverger (1954) developed and publicised
it. For a discussion of its drawbacks, see Riker (1982), Blau (2001) or Rogowski and Kayser
(2002).
17The results can be replicated for other values of τ , to fit a specific country’s electoral system
and any given geographical distribution of preferences. Section 4.1 discusses this issue further.
From the previous assumption, (1) can be rewritten as follows:
MPR =
√√√√ 3∑
i=1
(
3∑
j=1
cjz
j
i − ci
)2
(2a)
MMV =
√√√√ 3∑
i=1
(
3∑
j=1
c3j
c31 + c
3
2 + c
3
3
z
j
i − ci
)2
(2b)
3 Main predictions
In this section, after deriving the parties’ shares of power, I compute the voters’
misrepresentation (Equation 1) under both proportional and plurality systems. I
show that the distortion under the former is greater than that under the latter
when δ is sufficiently large.
A coalition of 2 out of 3 parties always secures a majority. The formateur
compares its utility in each possible coalition in order to choose the other member.
Ex ante, eight scenarios may occur, depending on the identity of the formateur.
Proposition 1 (Sharing rule) In equilibrium, coalitions always include only two
parties. Formateur i proposes to party j its continuation value vj, and nothing
to the other one. The share vector zi =
(
zii; z
i
j ; z
i
x
)
takes the following values(
1− zij ;
δ
1−δei
(ejz
j
j + exz
x
j ); 0
)
. Party x, excluded from the coalition, receives 0;
party j obtains the present value of what it would get (in discounted expected terms)
in the next period.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 2 (Minimal winning coalition) In the SSPPS equilibrium, the
formateur always forms a coalition with the smallest party.18 The ex-ante unique
equilibrium coalitions are {(1,3),(2,3),(3,2)}, where the first element of a pair de-
notes the formateur. The equilibrium shares depend on the formateur: a priori,
zij 6= z
j
i .
Proof. See Appendix B.
Corollary 2.1 (Probability of forming a coalition) From Assumption 3 re-
garding recognition probabilities, the probability Pr(S) of coalition S = (i, j) is
Pr(1, 3) = e1, Pr(2, 3) = e2 and Pr(3, 2) = e3.
Corollary 2.2 Table 1 summarises the parties’ equilibrium shares zi.
z1 =
(
(1−δ)(1−δe3)
1−δ+δ2e1e3
; 0; (1−δe2−δe3)δe3
1−δ+δ2e1e3
)
z2 =
(
0; (1−δ)(1−δe3)
1−δ+δ2e1e3
; (1−δe2−δe3)δe3
1−δ+δ2e1e3
)
z3 =
(
0; (1−δ)δe2
1−δ+δ2e1e3
; (1−δ)(1−δe2)+δ
2e1e3
1−δ+δ2e1e3
)
Table 1: The equilibrium vectors zi.
Proposition 2 means that small parties are “cheaper”; the formateur prefers to
form a coalition with them. From Table 1, the discount factor δ plays a key role
in the budget share. The formateur is the residual claimant: it pays its partners
their continuation value, which is an increasing function of their patience. The
shares are, a priori, different for each party. When δ is close to one (the parties
are patient), the formateur is forced to give almost the entire share to the other
party.19
Figure 3: Coalitional space Z
Figure 3 shows feasible combinations of budget share amongst 3 parties. Each
axis represents one party’s share of the votes and of the budget. The simplex dark
side is the set Z; a socially optimal share would attribute to each party exactly the
budget that corresponds to the share of votes received. This would be independent
18This result is in line with the empirical evidence that parties tend to form minimal winning
coalitions, to reduce coordination costs and increase efficiency. Theoretical (Riker (1962)) and
empirical (Martin and Stevenson (2001)) studies confirm this.
19This differs from Snyder Jr., Ting, and Ansolabehere (2005), where the equilibrium shares
are all the same, since the authors solve for one of the mixed strategy equilibria (players compete
on zi, to belong to the winning coalition; the formateur can extract more surplus from them).
of δ and the point would lie on the simplex front face (e.g., point C). In equilibrium,
a party is always excluded (Proposition 1); share points lie on an axis (e.g., points
A and B) and the location depends on δ: the larger the value of δ, the farther the
equilibrium is from the formateur’s axis.
Using Table 1 in Equation 1, I compute voters’ misrepresentation under the
proportional (MPR) and plurality (MMV ) rules. Equation 1 becomes:
My =
[(
e1
(1− δ) (1− δe3)
1− δ + δ2e1e3
− c1
)2
+ (3)
(
e2
(1− δ) (1− δe3)
1− δ + δ2e1e3
+ e3
(1− δ) δe2
1− δ + δ2e1e3
− c2
)2
+
(
(e1 + e2) (1− δe2 − δe3) δe3
1− δ + δ2e1e3
+ e3
(1− δ) (1− δe2) + δ
2e1e3
1− δ + δ2e1e3
− c3
)2]0.5
,
where each line is a function of the distance between a party’s share of the vote
and its power. By definition, under proportional representation ci = ei: Equation
3 becomes
MPR =
δc1c3
(1− δ + δ2c1c3)
[
(1− δ + δc1)
2 + (δc2)
2 + (1− δc3)
2]0.5
. (4)
Using the cube rule (Assumption 5) to obtain the relationship between ci and
ei, under majority voting conditions, Equation 3 becomes
MMV =
1
x
[[
c31 (1− δ)
(
σ − δc33
)
− c1x
]2
+ (5)
[
c32 (1− δ) σ − c2x
]2
+
[
c33
(
σ − δ
(
c31 + c
3
2
))
− c3x
]2]0.5
,
where σ =
3∑
i=1
c3i and x = (1− δ)σ
2 + c31c
3
3δ
2.
The difference in misrepresentation between the two electoral systems is
MM(c1, c2, c3, δ) =M
PR −MMV = (6)
δc1c3
(1− δ + δ2c1c3)
[
(1− δ + δc1)
2 + (δc2)
2 + (1− δc3)
2]0.5−
1
x
[[
c31 (1− δ)
(
σ − δc33
)
− c1x
]2
+
[
c32 (1− δ) σ − c2x
]2
+
[
c33
(
σ − δ
(
c31 + c
3
2
))
− c3x
]2]0.5
.
The fact that MM(c1, c2, c3, δ) > 0 means that the difference between the par-
ties’ expected and optimal shares is larger under proportional than plurality rule;
when Equation 6 is positive, plurality rule better represents voters’ preferences
(i.e., each party’s expected budget share is closer to its share of the vote).
Proposition 3 (Role of the discount factor) Regardless of the distribution of
seats among parties, two thresholds exist (δ ≈ 0.108, δ¯ ≈ 0.780) for the discount
factor such that: a) majority voting is preferable when δ > δ¯, and b) proportional
rule is preferable when δ < δ. When the value of δ is between the two thresholds,
the parties’ relative shares of seats determine which voting system is preferable.
Proof. See Appendix C.
From Proposition 3, either system is always preferred outside the interval
(0.108, 0.780); within the interval, the outcome depends on the relative shares
of seats. After the elections, a coalition forms: the budget share that the forma-
teur gives to its partner is equal to the partner’s continuation value. When δ is
sufficiently small (parties are impatient), it is cheap to persuade a partner: indeed,
as δ tends to 0, the formateur’s share tends to one and parties’ expected utility
tends to their shares of seats, and the proportional electoral system is the best.20
Since filter 2 (Figure 1) disappears for δ going to zero, there is no reason to distort
the mechanism at the filter 1 level.
The share that the formateur has to give its partner equals the partner’s dis-
counted expected earnings. As δ gets larger (the parties are patient), distortion
becomes apparent at the filter two level: the formateur has to give to its partner a
larger portion of future earnings; the small parties’ expected shares become grea-
ter than their shares of the votes received. A plurality system distorts election
results in the opposite direction (reducing small parties’ shares of seats); when δ
is sufficiently large (δ > 0.78), filter two’s distortion level is large and majority
rule becomes desirable. When δ ∈ (0.108, 0.78), small parties’ bargaining power
is limited: according to the parties’ relative shares of seats, the distortion in plu-
rality rule may be larger than what is necessary to counter-balance the distortion
associated with coalition formation (i.e., the distortion at the filter 1 level induced
by plurality rule is larger than the one at the filter 2 level). In particular, for
δ ∈ (0.108, 0.78), with c3 and c2 sufficiently large, majority voting is better than
proportional rule.
20Analytically, δ → 0 implies zij → 0, thus z
i
i → 1 and EUi(z
S
i , 0) =
∑
h∈D pihz
h
i → pii. Since
pii = ei, to minimise the difference between the share of votes (ci) and the expected share of
budget for a party (EUi(z
S
i , 0)) we need ei = ci, which is the case under the proportional electoral
system.
3.1 Relaxing certain assumptions
This subsection briefly discusses certain assumptions. Limiting the number of
parties to 3 allows us to obtain closed-form results. It is possible to solve the
model for n > 3 parties, but additional restrictions must be introduced. It would
be necessary to model the formateur’s trade-off between increasing the number of
parties and forming a coalition that includes larger parties. Proposition 2 may not
hold: a coalition that includes the smallest party may be not sufficient to secure
the majority. According to which kind of coalition is formed, the thresholds for δ
would change, but the results would qualitatively remain the same.
Relaxing Assumption 1 can lead to two scenarios: if a party controls the ma-
jority of seats regardless of the electoral system, then all rules are equally repre-
sentative of voter preferences. Additional, non-trivial analysis is required for the
case in which one party controls the majority only under one regime.
If (contrary to Assumption 2) the coalition’s value depends on the identity of
the partners (e.g., because of ideological affinities), as for the number of parties,
the specific form of the utility function would heavily affect results, which would
have been assumption driven. A model with total incompatibility between two
parties is equivalent to the model with n− 1 parties.
As regards the common value of δ (Assumption 4), the discount factor of the
non-formateur party determines the parties’ shares; all results can be extended,
replacing δ by the discount factor of the non-formateur party in the winning coali-
tion. The value of δ must always be strictly less than 1 to ensure that the solution
to the problem exists and is unique.
Section 4.1 discusses the role of Assumption 5. In particular, it explains the
role of τ and how the results change for τ < 3.
4 An application with data from the Italian elec-
tions
In Italy, over the two last legislatures, the smallest parties in the winning coalitions
commanded great power compared to their shares of seats in Parliament. In this
section I use the Italian election results to illustrate the model.21
The Italian Parliament has two houses: the Lower house and the Senate. All
adults (older than 18 years of age) can vote for the former, and those over 25 can
vote for both. The electoral law permits region-specific rules for each house. Out of
20 regions, in 18 (19 for the Lower house) the electoral law is based on proportional
21Election results can be found on the web page of the Ministero degli interni, on the web page
of each of the two houses of Parliament, and on many independent web pages.
representation. For my calculations, I used the numbers of votes received, in order
to eliminate local specificities.
In 2006 a centre-left coalition elected Romano Prodi as prime minister. The
winning coalition officially included eight parties in the Senate; most of them were
created ad hoc before the election, to take advantage of certain unusual features
of the electoral law; only few of them had their own leaders and programmes
independent of the main party. I focus on the small independent party UDEUR.
This party represented about 1% of all citizens on a national basis. It was pivotal
and when in 2008 it left the coalition, the government lost the majority and new
elections were called.
Coalition members were aware of the consequences of this party leaving: the
majority controlled three more senators than the opposition coalition, including
the external support received from certain “senatori a vita”22. During the last
months of Mr. Prodi’s government, UDEUR’s senators used their influence on the
media and their pivotal positions (by threatening to leave) to push through some
major changes in several laws, especially in the “Finanziaria”.23 They pursued
their own agenda and clearly showed that their real power within the coalition
amounted to more than 1%.
In what follows, I consider the left and the right coalitions as two individual
parties (named CL and CR) and UDEUR as a third independent party that can
form a coalition with either party.24 The first column of Table 2 summarises the
2006 Senate seats under proportional representation. The second column is the
“cube rule” estimate of the shares of seats under a plurality system.
Seats - Proportional Representation Seats - Plurality System
CL 49.5% 49.999%
CR 49.5% 49.999%
UDEUR 1% 0.002%
Table 2: Seat Share - 2006 Italian Senate
The budget share depends on the discount factor: Figure 4 depicts the equili-
brium share for each party for different levels of δ. The straight line refers to the
majority voting system; the dotted line refers to proportional representation; the
dashed line represents the parties’ shares of votes; each chart corresponds to one
party: (from top left) CR, CL and UDEUR. Under plurality rule, both CR’s and
22“Senatori a vita” are senators who are not elected (e.g., former Republic Presidents). They
sit in Parliament for life.
23The “Legge Finanziaria” is one of the most important Italian laws; it determines the forth-
coming year’s public expenditures.
24This would have been politically plausible; UDEUR is a centre party, its leader had already
formed certain coalitions with the centre-right party and he ran in the 2009 European Parliament
elections.
Figure 4: Budget share depending on δ
CL’s shares increase at the expense of UDEUR, whose share is extremely large
under the proportional context, if the discount factor is large (e.g., for δ = 0.99,
under proportional representation its expected share is 33%, while under plurality
rule it is 0.02%).
Equation 1 measures the Euclidean distance between a party’s average power
and the optimal scenario, given voter preferences; the larger its value, the greater
the difference between the distribution of power according to the government and
voters’ preferences. Using the 2006 election data, the difference in misrepresenta-
tion (MM , Equation 6) is shown in Figure 5 as a function of δ. For δ > 66.7%, a
plurality system ensures a better representation of voters; the opposite is true for
δ < 66.7%.
Figure 5: Misrepresentation as a function of δ
After the 2008 elections, due to a change in the political strategies of the
two main parties, only four parties are now represented in Parliament: PD-IDV
(the centre-left party),25 PDL (the centre-right party), Lega Nord and UDC, the
smallest party.26 Table 3summarises the situation.
Seats - Proportional Representation Seats - Plurality System
PD-IDV 41.7% 49.8%
PDL 41.5% 49.2%
Lega Nord 10.5% 0.8%
UDC 6.2% 0.2%
Table 3: Seats Share - 2008 Italian Congress
UDC did not obtain enough seats to form a two party coalition, so it became a
“dummy player”, that is: regardless of the coalition, its contribution will always be
irrelevant; it never belongs to a winning coalition. The successful coalition was the
centre-right group (PDL with Lega Nord), and Mr. Berlusconi was elected prime
minister. Lega Nord had already proved that it would not accept the coalition’s
decisions without negotiations. PDL had already withdrawn its own law proposals
more than once because they were not consistent with Lega Nord’s platform, and
promoted others, against the will of most of the parliament (including several PDL
leaders).27
Figure 6 shows the share of budget of each party, according to the value of
δ for PD, PDL and Lega Nord. Under proportional rule, Lega Nord secures a
share of budget that is considerably larger than its share of votes received (e.g.,
with a share of the vote of 10.5% and for δ = 80% the expected budget share
for Lega Nord is 26.8%, while under majority voting this value would be 2.5%).
Considering aggregate data and the level of misrepresentation calculated using
Equation 6, Figure 7 shows that, for δ ≥ 64.64% the majority rule is preferable to
the proportional system.
4.1 Comments on the cube rule
I assumed that the cube rule would hold with τ = 3. Although empirically valid,
the cube rule lacks a theoretical foundation. The actual share of seats depends on
25PD and IDV, through a pre-electoral agreement, ran together and shared both a single
platform and a single candidate for prime minister.
26To be more precise, one more party (SVP) is represented. SVP is a local party from a
cross-border region where the majority of citizens speak German. Aimed at protecting linguistic
minorities, a special electoral rule allowed SVP to obtain 2 seats in the Parliament (equivalent
to 0.3%).
27For instance, in April 2009 Lega Nord, by threatening to leave the coalition, secured from
Mr. Berlusconi’s party permission to change the day of a referendum, at an estimated cost of
400 million Euros.
Figure 6: Budget share depending on δ
Figure 7: Misrepresentation as a function of δ
the distribution of preferences across districts.28 For some countries, τ = 3 may
be a poor proxy; different values for τ account for idiosyncratic differences in the
electoral system, the distribution of voter preferences, etc.29
I wish to explore how the previous results change as functions of δ and τ . In
the 2006 case, we have two big parties and one very small one; in the 2008 case,
the smallest party is relatively large. Figure 8 shows how the misrepresentation
index changes with δ and τ . Whatever the value of τ , non-proportional voting
systems perform better if the parties are patient.
28For instance, in a country where, in all districts, the parties’ shares are (40%, 30%, 30%),
under a plurality system the first party obtains 100% of seats, while the cube rule predicts a
share (54%, 23%, 23%).
29As a general rule, we should expect τ to be larger in a country with one big party and many
small local parties, while τ should be less than 3 for countries with heterogeneous districts, strong
local parties and no large national parties.
Figure 8: Changes both in δ and τ
Figure 9: Effect of τ for different levels of δ
For low levels of δ, non-proportional systems perform better only when the
value of τ is small. In Figure 9 we can see that the peak is close to one for
low levels of δ (each line corresponds to a different level of δ, and lower lines
are for lower values of δ). When the smallest party is very small, the majority
rule might cause too much distortion and a small value of τ would be preferable
(this can be obtained artificially, with a mixed electoral system, or it can simply
be a consequence of the geographical distribution of preferences). On the other
hand, when the smallest party obtains a large share of votes, the majority voting
distortion is smaller and it is preferable to use a τ value closer to three.
Figure 10 shows how the level of misrepresentation changes as a function of δ
Figure 10: Effect of δ for different levels of τ
for different levels of τ . The value of δ for which proportional and majority voting
rule are equivalent is an increasing function of τ : the smaller the value of τ , the
more it is likely that the introduction of distortions in favour of large parties will
prove beneficial.
5 Conclusions
Electoral systems are a social compromise. Many countries (e.g., Italy) use pro-
portional representation, while others (e.g., the U.K. or the U.S.A.) rely on a
plurality-based system. Most countries have adapted their systems to meet local
needs. My work focuses on the two basic electoral systems (i.e., purely proportional
versus plurality systems), disregarding local specificities.
Proportional electoral rules are costly in term of governance: the number of
represented parties in the winning coalition tends to increase, the expected dura-
tion for which governments will hold power falls and the average time to introduce
structural changes increases, because of extended negotiation times. According to
advocates of proportional representation, however, decisions reflect citizens’ prefe-
rences since, by definition, the Parliament’s composition precisely reflects voters’
preferences.
People forget that decisions in a proportional government are mainly made by
the government and by the Parliamentary majority. Coalitions form to support a
government, and parties’ shares of power depend on their role in the coalition, not
on their shares of seats in Parliament. Given the distortion due to negotiation and
the importance of bargaining during the coalition formation stage, it is pointless
to measure the degree of representativeness of Parliament. What matters is the
relationship between voter preferences and the parties’ power in government.
I have shown that, especially when parties are patient during the coalition
formation stage, the distortion resulting from the negotiation process (filter 2)
increases the small parties’ power; at the election stage (filter 1), the plurality rule
distorts Parliament’s representativeness; the two distortions have opposite signs. If
the parties are impatient, filter 2 distortion will be negligible; thus a non-distorting
electoral system is better. However, when parties are patient, the magnitude of
the distortion increases and it is more beneficial to use a non-proportional electoral
system. My model demonstrates that, under a proportional system, governments
are not always more representative; a plurality voting system can be preferable in
terms of representativeness.
The Italian example is instructive: during the 15th legislature, a party repre-
senting 1% of voters, threatening the government, managed to substantially change
part of the 2008 “Finanziaria” law and this led to the government’s downfall in
January 2008. Similarly, during the first year of the 16th legislature, Lega Nord
(11% of votes at the 2008 elections) strongly influenced the government’s decisions
regarding controversial issues, such as reforms of the justice system, of immigra-
tion laws and of federalism. With a less proportional system (for instance, under
a plurality system), the role of small parties would decrease and more decisions
would be taken by parties that represent a larger fraction of the population.
Plurality rule may excessively reduce the smallest party’s power. Preliminary
results from section 4.1, and in particular the study of misrepresentation for dif-
ferent values of τ (that is, the degree of distortion within an electoral system),
suggest that the proportional representation is never the most representative ap-
proach. Better results can be achieved by introducing certain distortions that will
increase the power of large parties.
Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
There is no reason to form a coalition with more than one party, since the value of a
coalition is constant and two parties are sufficient to control the majority of seats.
The formateur, namely the residual claimant, minimises j’s share (zj) and proposes
to it exactly its reservation value. The cheapest price that a party accepts is its next
period discounted profit, i.e., its continuation value vj = δ(eiz
i
j+ejz
j
j+exz
x
j ). Thus,
it follows directly from zij = vj = δ(eiz
i
j + ejz
j
j + exz
x
j ) that z
i
j =
δ
1−δei
(ejz
j
j + exz
x
j ).
B Proof of Proposition 2
The generic shares of the budget with three parties are shown in Table 4.30
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Shares 1 2 3
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Table 4: Generic shares with three parties
By solving the system of equations, we can (for each of the eight scenarios)
compute the continuation value for each party. For the case {(1,3), (2,3), (3,2)},
the results are as follows:
z11 = 1− z
1
3 (7a)
z22 = 1− z
2
3 (7b)
z33 = 1− z
3
2 (7c)
z13 = δ(e1z
1
3 + e2z
2
3 + e3z
3
3) (7d)
z23 = δ(e1z
1
3 + e2z
2
3 + e3z
3
3) (7e)
z32 = δ(e2z
2
2 + e3z
3
2). (7f)
Noticing that 7d=7e, we obtain z11 = z
2
2 and z
1
3 = z
2
3 . Combining 7b with 7e
30Note that, according to the coalition formed, some of the cells in the table will take the value
zero.
and 7f with 7c, we obtain:
z22 = 1−
δe3
1− δe1 − δe2
z33 (8a)
z33 = 1−
δe2
1− δe3
z22 . (8b)
Solving the system, we obtain
z22 =
1− δe3
1−δe1−δe2
1−δ+δ2e1e3
(1−δe1−δe2)(1−δe3)
(9a)
z33 =
1−δe2−δe3
1−δe3
1−δ+δ2e1e3
(1−δe1−δe2)(1−δe3)
. (9b)
After some simplifications and using the property that δe1 + δe2 + δe3 = δ, we
obtain the results summarised in Table 5.
Formateur
Shares 1 2 3
z1
(1−δ)(1−δe3)
1−δ+δ2e1e3
0 0
z2 0
(1−δ)(1−δe3)
1−δ+δ2e1e3
(1−δ)δe2
1−δ+δ2e1e3
z3
(1−δe2−δe3)δe3
1−δ+δ2e1e3
(1−δe2−δe3)δe3
1−δ+δ2e1e3
(1−δ)(1−δe2)+δ2e1e3
1−δ+δ2e1e3
Table 5: Shares at equilibrium
The continuation value depends on the coalition and on the identity of the
formateur. For a stationary equilibrium, each party always chooses to form the
same coalition when it is the formateur. For stationarity, its choice must be the
best response to the other players’ behaviour at each time period, and the strategy
always has to be the same. Committing to a given strategy allows parties to modify
their continuation value when they are not the formateur.
Within the eight scenarios, we look for Nash simultaneous stationary subgame
perfect equilibria in pure strategies (SSPPS). Each player has two possible actions
(consisting in forming a coalition with either of the remaining parties). Comparing
expected payoffs of each party in each situation (through a reduced form game
matrix of payoff), we notice that only scenario {(1, 3), (2, 3), (3, 2)} is SSPPS. If
for example party 2 always form a coalition (2,3) and party 3 a coalition (3,2),
then for party 1 it is a best-reply strategy to form a coalition (1,3).
To check that this scenario really is an equilibrium, take the generic recognition
probabilities (a, b, c). From the definition of the continuation value, v∗j = az
1
j +
bz2j + cz
3
j ; thus
v1 =
a (1− δ) (1− δc)
1− δ + δ2ac
+ 0 + 0 (10)
v2 =0 + b
(1− δ) (1− δc)
1− δ + δ2ac
+ c
(1− δ) δb
1− δ + δ2ac
=
b (1− δ)
1− δ + δ2ac
(11)
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(1− δb− δc) δc
1− δ + δ2ac
+ c
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1− δ + δ2ac
=
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and thus v =
(
a(1−δ)(1−δc)
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; b(1−δ)
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; (1−δc−δb)c
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)
.
For a = e1, b = e2, c = e3, and knowing that z
i
j = δvj for i 6= j, we recover the
results in Table 5.
We now confirm that no player wishes to deviate: we refer to an equilibrium E
via the corresponding coalition that is formed when a given party is the formateur.
We call E∗ the equilibrium proposed above (that is, {(1, 3), (2, 3), (3, 2)}) and we
define Ei as the alternative candidate equilibrium if party i deviates.
Focusing on stationary pure strategy equilibria, to show that no player wants
to deviate, I show that a) E∗ 1 E
1 = ({1, 2}, {2, 3}, {3, 2}), b) E∗ 2 E
2 =
({1, 3}, {2, 1}, {3, 2}) and c) E∗ 3 E
3 = ({1, 3}, {2, 3}, {3, 1}).
a) E∗ 1 E
1 if and only if the continuation value of party 3 when the equili-
brium is E∗ is smaller than that of party 2 in the equilibrium E1, that is iff v3(E
∗ <
v2(E
1),, which means (1−δe2−δe3)e3
1−δ+δ2e1e3
<
(1−δe2−δe3)e2
1−δ+δ2e1e2
. Thus e3 (1− δ + δ
2e1e2) <
e2 (1− δ + δ
2e1e3). Since e3 < e2, it is clear that e3 (1− δ) < e2 (1− δ).
b) E∗ 2 E
2 iff v3(E
∗) < v1(E
2), which means (1−δe2−δe3)e3
1−δ+δ2e1e3
<
(1−δe1−δe3)e1
1−δ+δ2e2e3
.
From 0.5 > e1 > e2 > e3, it is a matter of simple algebra to show that the left
hand side is always smaller than the right hand side.
c) E∗ 3 E
3 iff v2(E
∗) < v1(E
3), which means (1−δ)e2
1−δ+δ2e1e3
<
(1−δ)e1
1−δ+δ2e2e3
. The
result follows directly.
C Proof of Proposition 3
Solving equation 6 for δ, a plurality system is preferable if and only ifMM(c1, c2, c3, δ)
is positive. The proof consists of three parts: the first shows the existence of a
value of δ for which Equation 6 equals zero. This guarantees that (independent of
any relevant parameters) for all δ below a threshold the proportional representa-
tion system is preferred, while above a possibly different threshold, the plurality
rule is preferred. The second part of the proof, through a counterexample, shows
that for some values of δ, the sign depends on the value of the parameters c1, c2
and c3. The two parts together are sufficient to conclude that there exists i) a
threshold for δ under which the proportional rule is preferred, ii) another, higher
threshold above which the plurality rule is preferred, and iii) an interval between
the two thresholds for which the preferred electoral system depends on the relative
size of the groups of voters. MM(c1, c2, c3, δ) is defined implicitly; it is impossible
to compute the value of the 2 thresholds, but the third part of the proof shows
the graphical results of the numerical simulation to identify the value of the 2
thresholds.
First part: From the Bolzano Theorem, a threshold δ¯ exists. In particular,
MM(c1, c2, c3, 0) = −
1
σ2
[(
σc31 − c1σ
2
)2
+
(
σc32 − c2σ
2
)2
+
(
σc33 − c3σ
2
)2]0.5
≤ 0,
with strict inequality for all ci 6=
1
3
. On the other hand,
MM(c1, c2, c3, 1) =
[
c21 + c
2
2 + (c1 + c2)
2
]0.5
−
[
c21 + c
2
2 +
(
c33
c31
− c3
)2]
0.5 ≥ 0.
The function crosses the axis at least once, since the function is continuous on
δ ∈ [0, 1], MM(c1, c2, c3, 0) ≤ 0, and MM(c1, c2, c3, 1) ≥ 0. This part of the proof
is independent of the ci, while the threshold depends on these data.
Second part: Solving Equation 6 for δ = 1
2
, the plurality rule is better for
c1 = .4, c2 = .3 and c3 = .3 (MM(0.4, 0.3, 0.3, 0.5) ≈ 0.02); the proportional rule
is better for c1 = .4, c2 = .35 and c3 = .25 (MM(0.4, 0.35, 0.25, 0.5) ≈ −0.02).
Therefore the preferred electoral rule, when δ = 0.5, depends on the relative sizes
of the parties. The first part of the proof shows that, for δ being sufficiently low,
the proportional approach is always better; we conclude that there is a threshold
δ < 1
2
below which ci does not matter and the proportional situation is preferred.
Similarly, there exists a threshold δ¯ > 1
2
above which the plurality system is always
preferred. Finally, in the neighbourhood of δ = 1
2
, the result depends on the value
of certain relevant parameters.
Third part: As previously suggested, the equation can not be solved explicitly,
and the values δ and δ¯ must be derived numerically.
Figure 11: The impact of δ
Figure 11 describes the behaviour of Equation 6, showing its shape for six
values of δ. The horizontal axis depicts the share of seats e3 of party 3, while e2 is
shown on the depth axis. The dark surface corresponds to the zero plan; the light
surface depicts Equation 6. Given δ and the combinations of different shares of
seats, the light surface is above the dark one if the majority voting is preferable.
For instance, for δ = 0.78 and δ = 0.98, the light surface is above the dark surface
regardless of the distribution of seats among parties.
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